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POLYGAMY IN AMERICA: HOW THE VARYING LEGAL 
STANDARDS FAIL TO PROTECT MOTHERS AND CHILDREN 
FROM ITS ABUSES 
INTRODUCTION 
Once seventeen-year-old Flora Jessop was finally able to flee the 
fundamentalist Mormon sect that was her childhood home, she ran for her life, 
fearing that church members would hunt her down.1  The sect had “strict rules, 
especially for girls: no pants, haircuts, drugs, booze or boys; just ‘keep sweet’ 
and obey.”2  Although it was terrifying to give up the life she was taught was 
the only path to salvation, Jessop said “she would rather wage the battles she 
faces on ‘the outside’ than live a life of submission and abuse.”3  Running 
away enabled her to escape from a culture that she felt was backward and 
malevolent.  She expressed that many children in her situation would feel the 
same way if given a choice.  “The pain got so bad in heaven that I was willing 
to damn myself to hell to escape it,” she explained.4 
Or consider Miss Kingston, a sixteen-year-old girl from Utah.5  Her father, 
a member of a fundamentalist Mormon sect based in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
pulled her out of school and forced her to become the fifteenth wife of his 
brother, the girl’s thirty-two-year-old uncle.6  Kingston tried to escape twice 
but was caught each time.7  After the second escape she fled to her mother for 
protection, who refused to listen to her daughter and promptly turned her over 
to her father.8  She was then taken to a remote ranch used as a “reeducation 
camp” for misbehaving wives and disobedient children.9  There, in the back of 
a barn, her father whipped her savagely with a belt and left her to suffer.10  She 
 
 1. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Ex-Sect Members Escape Polygamy but Not Pain, CNN NEWS, 
Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/16/polygamy.escapes/index.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH 18 
(2003). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. KRAKAUER, supra note 5, at 18. 
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limped five miles along a dirt road until she found a gas station where she 
could call the police.11 
In 2008, over 400 children were removed by state officials from a ranch 
run by a sect of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
(hereinafter “FLDS”), after an alleged phone call was received from a sixteen-
year-old girl claiming to have been physically and sexually abused.12  The 
Texas Department of Family and Protective Sources was “[c]oncerned that the 
community had a culture of polygamy and of directing girls younger than 
eighteen to enter spiritual unions with older men and have children.”13  The 
state action elicited an understandable outcry from the mothers of the children, 
arguing that the removal was a mass violation of their human and 
constitutional rights.14  Images of the devastated mothers in tears summon 
feelings of empathy and perhaps outrage, but at the same time there remains an 
uncomfortable but crucial question: do their tears truly outweigh the deep 
concern for the abuse their children are enduring?  As Professor Marci 
Hamilton pointed out, “[T]he boys were being groomed to be rapists, the 
younger girls were being groomed to be victims, and the adolescents were 
being sexually assaulted on a regular basis.”15  Returning the children without 
conditions for their protection, as the FLDS leaders claim is their right, could 
be construed as permission to continue the community practice of sex and 
marriage to children as young as twelve years old.16 
Although polygamy is clearly being practiced in shadowed corners, it is a 
long-established criminal act in the United States.17  As a result, polygamy has 
always had an impact on child custody proceedings when practiced by one or 
both parents.18  Its controversial presence has had a strong yet varying effect 
on child custody rulings, as courts struggle to weigh the child’s best interests 
against parental rights and the freedom to practice one’s own religion.19  A 
highly-publicized recent battle is the In re Texas Department of Family & 
Protective Services case, for which final custody proceedings are still 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Serv., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613–14 (Tex. 2008). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union & American Civil Liberties Union of Texas as 
Amici Curiae in Opposition to Relator’s Petition for Mandamus at 1–2, In re Tex. Dep’t of 
Family & Protective Serv., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008) (No. 08-0391). 
 15. Marci Hamilton, Why the Texas Supreme Court’s Ruling Regarding the FLDS Mothers 
Is Significantly More Protective of the Children Involved than the Media Have Painted It to Be, 
FINDLAW, June 3, 2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20080603.html. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 18. Lauren C. Miele, Note, Big Love or Big Problem: Should Polygamous Relationships Be 
a Factor in Determining Child Custody?, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 105, 128 (2008). 
 19. Id. at 133–34. 
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pending.20  This Note examines the ways courts have balanced these interests 
and why, what impact this most recent Texas case has on polygamy’s standing 
in the United States, and where the legal stance on polygamy should be 
headed.  Part I focuses on the problem: how much of an impact should the 
practice of polygamy have on a child custody ruling?  Fleshing out this 
question requires analyzing the history of the FLDS, the impact the FLDS has 
on mothers, and the malleable, varying “best interests of the child” tests.  Part 
II examines the impact of the recent Texas polygamy case, discussing the 
majority stance and the distinction made by its concurring opinion.  Part III 
turns to a 1955 Utah Supreme Court case that exemplifies the position the 
United States once had towards polygamy.  Part IV then compares the recent 
Texas ruling to the older Utah Supreme Court decision, examining the dangers 
of the current standard and emphasizing why courts should revert back to 
taking a stronger stand against polygamy.  The illegality of polygamy and its 
abusive impact on children outweigh a mother’s right to raise her children and 
practice her religion in an FLDS polygamous sect more often than courts 
acknowledge.  The Utah decision should be strongly considered in future child 
custody rulings involving polygamy as it signifies a better balance between 
religious freedom, parental rights, and child custody than the current legal 
standard. 
I.  ADDRESSING THE POLYGAMY PROBLEM 
A. Custody Battles: Why Balancing Parental Rights Against Child Interests 
Is Difficult 
It is well established that persons engaging in polygamy do not have a First 
Amendment right to do so.21  Although the Free Exercise Clause does provide 
some protection for those engaged in practices stemming from their religious 
beliefs, the right to engage in those actions “is not totally free from legislative 
restrictions.”22  While the government may not interfere with mere religious 
belief or opinion, it may interfere with practices.23  Activities of individuals, 
even when religiously based, must bow to “regulation by the States in the 
exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general 
welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers.”24  
To allow otherwise would “in effect . . . permit every citizen to become a law 
unto himself.”25 
 
 20. 255 S.W.3d 613. 
 21. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 22. State v. Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 667 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)). 
 23. Id. (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166). 
 24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
 25. Fischer, 199 P.3d at 667 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67). 
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Bigamy and polygamy are crimes according to the laws of many countries, 
not only the United States.26  Religious belief cannot be accepted as a 
justification for committing an overt criminal act.27  To extend exemption from 
punishment for such crimes would “shock the moral judgment of the 
community.”28  As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out: “However free the 
exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the 
country.”29 
Nonetheless, child custody battles where polygamous activity is a factor 
are not so clear-cut.  Despite the illegality of polygamy and lack of Free 
Exercise Clause protections, there is no per se rule that a mother must lose 
custody of her children if she practices polygamy, because courts must also 
consider and balance the needs of the children involved.30  Justice Scalia has 
referred to situations such as child custody disputes as presenting a “hybrid 
situation,”31 subject to strict scrutiny.32  Cases of child custody require a more 
complicated analysis, as constitutional protections beyond the Free Exercise 
Clause also come into play.33  State supreme courts have noted that parents 
have a constitutionally protected parental right to direct the education and 
religious upbringing of their children.34  Since custody cases involve a Free 
Exercise claim made in conjunction with other constitutional protections, a 
higher level of scrutiny and consideration is often necessary.35 
Justice Scalia’s hybrid approach may simply muddle the factors considered 
in a custody battle even further.  And state courts are split over whether 
heightened scrutiny should be applied in the context of parental rights and the 
Free Exercise Clause.36  Federal circuit courts have split on whether a hybrid 
rights claim should exist and if it does, determining, what qualifies as a hybrid 
 
 26. In re State in Interest of Black, 283 P.2d 887, 903–04 (Utah 1955). 
 27. Id. at 902. 
 28. Id. at 904. 
 29. Id.  See also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006) (stressing that irrevocable 
ordinance of state constitution prohibiting polygamous or plural marriages did not merely prevent 
legal recognition of polygamy, but required its prohibition). 
 30. Miele, supra note 18, at 134. 
 31. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 32. Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1172 (Pa. 2006).  This decision reaffirmed a higher 
level of scrutiny for cases involving a Free Exercise claim made in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections, such as the right of a parent to direct the upbringing and education of 
his child.  Id. 
 33. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (stating the right of parents to direct the education and upbringing of 
their children is a constitutionally protected right). 
 34. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213–14. 
 35. Id. at 214. 
 36. Ariana S. Cooper, Note, Free Exercise Claims in Custody Battles: Is Heightened 
Scrutiny Required Post-Smith?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 716, 716 (2008). 
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right.37  For example, where polygamy is present, should the First Amendment 
protection drop out, causing the hybrid situation to dissolve?  Moreover, it is 
unclear what the strict scrutiny analysis actually means and how it should be 
applied.38 
As a result, courts have struggled to establish polygamy’s weight in a child 
custody ruling, creating a variety of almost arbitrary “best interests of the 
child” tests and failing to uniformly define what degree of harm suffered by a 
child in a polygamous context warrants the removal of the child from his or her 
natural parents.  In attempts to define the standard of harm required and 
determine custody, it is essential and important for courts to focus in-depth on 
both the mothers’ rights and the children’s needs.  In examining the mothers, 
courts should consider the impact polygamy has on their ability to raise a child.  
For the children’s rights and needs, courts should take into consideration the 
impact polygamous practice has on a child’s health and safety, including 
whether or not polygamy should warrant per se removal of children since it is 
a crime.  Closely considering all the factors may help decide the best solution, 
both for the mothers and the children at stake, as exemplified in the Texas 
polygamy case.  First, the parent side of the scale will be examined in the 
framework of the FLDS culture.  Second, the issues in defining what is in the 
“best interests of the child” will be examined. 
B. The History and Membership of the FLDS 
1. Defining the FLDS 
In order to shed light on the ability of a mother in an FLDS polygamous 
sect to be a fit parent, it is necessary to understand and consider the FLDS 
structure and the role women have in it.39  “‘Mormon Fundamentalism’ 
denotes the beliefs and practices of contemporary schismatic groups” of the 
Mormon Church, such as the FLDS, that “follow the teachings of the Prophet 
Joseph Smith.”40  In the mid-1800s, Smith established the foundation for what 
is considered the FLDS Church today.41  The roots of his theology come from 
his interpretation of the Book of Mormon combined with the Old Testament.42  
Among other spiritual experiences, Smith claimed to receive a revelation that it 
was God’s will for Mormons to be married by Mormon elders, not secular civil 
 
 37. Id. at 722. 
 38. Id. at 724. 
 39. Not all polygamous families reside in a sect community; this Note focuses almost 
exclusively on FLDS sects because it is the situation addressed in In re Texas and that scenario 
seems the most detrimental to the women and children in polygamous environments. 
 40. Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1166 n.2 (Pa. 2006). 
 41. IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY 24 (1996). 
 42. Id. 
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authorities or ministers of other gospels.43  He “perceived God’s vision of 
marriage to be superior to federal and state regulations of marriage.”44 
Mormon Fundamentalists believe that God requires all “true” believers to 
abide by the principle of polygamy, regardless of Church mandate.45  The 
FLDS view is that plural marriage is “the most holy principle ever revealed to 
man.”46  Smith stated that a man and woman could bond in a spiritual way as 
husband and wife.47  Smith explained that God is an exalted man and that 
mortal existence is a testing ground for men to begin their progress toward 
exalted godhood for themselves, surrounded by their multiple wives and 
children.48  Men who reject polygamy “not only forfeit godhood, but [are] 
damned.”49  Additionally, women need to be married or sealed to “worthy” or 
“righteous” men to earn themselves a proper place.50  Essentially, the salvation 
of women depends on their union with a “righteous”—by definition, 
polygamous—man, and is fully dependant on the earthly behavior of this 
husband.51  Because there are few truly “righteous” men, several women must 
“be yoked to the same man in order to secure their salvation.”52 
Although there are considerable variations from case to case, the typical 
marriage in polygamous families takes place when husbands are about twenty-
one years old and wives are in their late teens.53  Each family averages about 
two-dozen children, depending on the number of wives.54  A single wife will 
have, on average, five to six children, with some having many more; almost 
18% of the wives in one study had eleven to nineteen children.55  According to 
the FLDS belief system, a man should have a minimum of three wives in order 
to achieve the highest form of salvation, and wives are required to be 
subordinate to their husbands.56 
 
 43. Kristen A. Berberick, Comment, Marrying into Heaven: The Constitutionality of 
Polygamy Bans Under the Free Exercise Clause, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 105, 108 (2007). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 110. 
 46. J. MAX ANDERSON, THE POLYGAMY STORY: FICTION AND FACT 1 (1979). 
 47. Berberick, supra note 43, at 110–11 (also called a “celestial marriage”). 
 48. Id. at 111. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 111–12.  Under the “law of priesthood,” a man “could have ten virgins given unto 
him” by the law, and it would not be adultery because the virgins belong to him.  Lisa M. Kelly, 
Bringing International Human Rights Law Home: An Evaluation of Canada’s Family Law 
Treatment of Polygamy, 65 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007). 
 51. See Berberick, supra note 43, at 111. 
 52. Id. at 112. 
 53. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 41, at 83. 
 54. Id. at 83–84. 
 55. Id. at 84. 
 56. Julian Coman, Three Wives Will Guarantee You a Place in Paradise. The Taliban? No: 
Welcome to the Rebel Mormons, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 19, 2003, at A1; see also Bonnie Ricks, 
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Men are often advised by Church leaders “to add new wives to their 
families.”57  Wives are also “pressured to accept another wife and encourage 
their husbands to enter into plural marriages on religious grounds.”58  When a 
young woman reaches marriageable age, the church places her with a husband 
according to a revelation from God to the Church prophet leader.59  The leader 
elects to take and give wives to and from men according to their worthiness, 
which is also called the “law of placing.”60  Most practicing spouses “refer[] 
fervently to their ‘religious beliefs and faith,’ ‘reaching salvation,’ ‘following 
the teachings of Joseph Smith,’ [and] achieving the ‘fullness of the gospel’” in 
defending a polygamous family life.61 
2. A Life of Abuse 
The belief system of an FLDS sect results in the men in polygamous 
families abusing the women and children that are a part of the sect and their 
family, among a host of other problems.  Fundamentalist sects “foster incest, 
underage marriage, sexual abuse, rape, physical abuse, nonconsensual 
marriage, birth defects, welfare fraud, poverty, and a deprivation of education 
and other opportunities.”62  The problem of sexual abuse in the FLDS is a 
“prevalent” by-product of polygamy.63  “The combination of polygamy and the 
law of placing often results in a shortage of available women within the church 
community.”64  The FLDS counters this by bonding older men to child brides 
and sometimes “excommunicating young boys and men to reduce the 
competition for wives.”65  The FLDS sanctions this incest and child abuse, 
defending the practice as its constitutional right under the Free Exercise 
Clause.66  Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff has linked child abuse and 
polygamy, claiming that “the FLDS belief system and lifestyle—including 
 
Review: The Sixth of Seven Wives: Escape from Modern Day Polygamy, INST. FOR RELIGIOUS 
RESEARCH, http://www.irr.org/mit/sixth-of-seven-wives-br.html (reviewing Mary Mackert’s 
book recounting a young girl’s experiences with polygamy) (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). 
 57. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 41, at 92. 
 58. Id. at 93. 
 59. See ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 41, at 89 (“[T]he prophet plays a strong role in 
arranging marriages.”); see also Ricks, supra note 56. 
 60. Julie M. Arnold, Note, “Divine” Justice and the Lack of Secular Intervention: 
Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in Mandatory Reporting Statutes to Combat Child 
Sexual Abuse, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 849, 857–58 (2008). 
 61. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 41, at 93. 
 62. Emily J. Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love is a Many 
Splendored Thing,” 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 315, 316 (2008). 
 63. Arnold, supra note 60, at 857. 
 64. Id. at 858. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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polygamy and the overall treatment of women—enable what amounts to 
institutionalized child rape and other forms of abuse.”67 
Courts and commentators have discussed “a number of harms associated 
with the practice of polygamy, ranging from the imposition of patriarchy to the 
abuse and neglect of women and children.”68  The Utah Supreme Court 
detailed some of the harms associated with polygamy.  The court explained 
that polygamy “often coincides with crimes targeting women and children, 
[including] incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child 
support.”69  Utah cases State v. Green and State v. Holm illustrate some of the 
harms implicated in, or resulting from, polygamous relationships. 
Information shared by some women of the FLDS sect reveals that 
“backbreaking labor is the norm at FLDS compounds (even for children), and 
physical violence is . . . routine.”70  Sister wives frequently punish each other 
for transgressions by beating the children of the offending wife.71  Mothers 
giving birth to babies with disabilities are deemed “sinful mothers” and are 
encouraged to let the baby die.72  Additionally, mothers are encouraged to keep 
many of their children at arm’s length—hugging, kissing, and signs of 
affection are frowned upon.73  Young men can be excommunicated for simply 
showing interest in a girl, and all members of the FLDS community are 
permitted almost no contact with the outside world.74  The FLDS life is one 
ruled by church leaders and “punctuated by oppression and emotional abuse.”75 
 
 67. Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same Sex-Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within the 
Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 580 (2008) (citing John 
Gibeaut, Violation or Salvation?: Prosecutors Say It’s a Sex Crime, Polygamist Leader Warren 
Jeffs Says It’s Counseling His Flock, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2007, at 26, 29). 
 68. Mark Strasser, Marriage, Free Exercise, and the Constitution, 26 LAW & INEQ. 59, 88 
(2008); see also State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004) (listing crimes that are usually 
attendant to polygamy practice). 
 69. Strasser, supra note 68, at 88–89 (quoting State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004)).  
Green, 99 P.3d at 830 (asserting Utah’s bigamy statute serves State interest “in protecting 
vulnerable individuals from exploitation and abuse.  The practice of polygamy, in particular, 
often coincides with crimes targeting women and children”); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 743 
(Utah 2006) (“[The case] raises important questions about the State’s ability to regulate marital 
relationships and prevent the formation and propagation of marital forms that the citizens of the 
State deem harmful.”). 
 70. Maureen Ryan, FLDS Polygamy Sects Get a Closer Look—And It’s Chilling, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, April 28, 2008, http://featuresblogs.chicagotribune.com/entertainment_tv/2008/04/flds-
polygamy-s.html. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Senator: Polygamous Sects Are ‘Form of Organized Crime,’ CNN NEWS, July 24, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/07/24/polygamy.hearing/index.html. 
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Some commentators emphasize that the men in polygamous community 
sects are essentially preying on “little girls who, from the cradle, know no 
other life but polygamy.”76  The mothers raise their daughters to marry within 
the sect, and the fathers raise their children to marry as children.77  “People . . . 
simply do not understand, and have not understood for fifty years, the 
devastating effect that the practice of polygamy has on young girls in our 
society.”78  States have claimed the interest of protecting children from sexual 
abuse as a compelling interest justifying polygamy prohibitions.  In State v. 
Green, “the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that child abuse coincides with 
polygamy, and because of the closed nature of polygamous communities, child 
abuse prosecutions are [hard to pursue.]”79  This is a problem, as no 
“reasonable person would disagree that extinguishing such abuse is a 
compelling interest.”80 
Reacting to the evidence of abuse occurring on sect compounds, states 
such as Utah have decided to focus law enforcement efforts on crimes 
occurring within polygamous communities, such as child abuse, domestic 
violence, and fraud.81  But is the move towards strengthening enforcement 
enough? 
3. America’s Historical and Current Attitude Toward Polygamy 
History shows that America’s position on polygamy has changed over 
time, leaning more and more towards tolerance of the practice.  In the 1800s, 
the United States federal system fought strongly against plural marriage.  
Legislation to outlaw polygamy was first passed in 1862 under President 
Lincoln.82  Over time, Congress also enacted laws criminalizing bigamy and 
polygamy, such as the Morrill Act of 1862,83 the Edmunds Act of 1882, and 
the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887.84  In 1890, Woodruff Wilson issued the 
First Manifesto, declaring that his advice to the FLDS was “to refrain from 
contracting any marriages forbidden by the law.”85  Courts paralleled the 
 
 76. See KRAKAUER, supra note 5, at 22. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 23. 
 79. Berberick, supra note 43, at 126. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1109 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 82. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 41, at 33. 
 83. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).  The Morrill Act provided the 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to bless the nation’s polygamy ban in its 1879 decision.  Gher, 
supra note 67, at 575. 
 84. Gher, supra note 67, at 575–76. 
 85. Mary K. Campbell, Comment, Mr. Peay’s Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon 
Polygamy, 1854–1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 51 (2001). 
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legislature, punishing polygamy whenever it came before the court:86 
essentially, “polygamists were thieves.”87 
Nevertheless, a small group of followers “kept the fundamentalist spirit 
alive.”88  The modern fundamentalist movement was born in 1929 after 
fundamentalists endured increasing waves of hostility from the main Mormon 
Church for their practice of plural marriage.89  This caused a schism, and the 
fundamentalist sects began to split from their Church of Latter Day Saints 
roots.90  The movement also led to a variety of legislative, criminal, and civil 
actions during the 1930s and 1940s, especially in Utah, Arizona, and Idaho.91 
Despite multiple attempts to exterminate polygamy, today the FLDS 
community is still “reasonably well-off, growing, and extending [its] influence 
into other communities.”92  The United States has taken a softer, less 
aggressive stance in recent years, as exemplified in more recent cases on 
polygamy.  By the middle of the twentieth century, the criminalization of 
polygamy had begun to take a noticeable turn.93  As the American public faced 
pictures of government officials taking fundamentalist children from the arms 
of their grief-stricken mothers, “the pendulum began to swing in favor of 
polygamists.”94  The era of persecution and over-prosecution was over, and the 
era of under-enforcement began.95  “[C]ourt battles vindicated the 
fundamentalists, finding gross violations of [their] due process rights.”96  Since 
1953 and the raid of a polygamous sect in Short Creek, Arizona, there have not 
been any major efforts to prosecute polygamists.97 
Today, although polygamy is outlawed across the nation, “prohibitions 
against polygamy are not being enforced in any systematic way.”98  The 
current anti-polygamy laws tend to be lax, especially when “compared to the 
thousands of prosecutions and imprisonments of polygamous couples” that 
took place during the nineteenth century.99  Prosecutors and police are 
generally pursuing legal action against polygamous families in much smaller 
 
 86. United States v. Peay, 14 P. 342 (Utah 1887); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168. 
 87. Campbell, supra note 85, at 30. 
 88. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 41, at 44. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 47. 
 91. Id. at 46. 
 92. Id. at 53. 
 93. Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 110 (2006). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 139. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Sigman, supra note 93, at 140. 
 99. See Gher, supra note 67, at 579. 
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numbers.100  Enforcement is one part in the ongoing political battle over how 
polygamists should be dealt with.101  The change in attitude towards the FLDS 
practices and enforcement of polygamy laws forces us to consider: Is the 
current trend the right one, or is it time for courts to take a stronger stance 
against polygamy, especially in the context of child custody?  With these 
considerations in mind, the issue requires further examination of the mothers’ 
position and the needs of the children. 
C. The Rights of Mothers in a Polygamous Setting 
There are two extremes in the spectrum of opinion regarding whether 
women who practice polygamy are fit to keep their children.  One extreme 
advocates that women in polygamous settings are self-assured, independent 
individuals.  Thus, a mother’s choice to engage in polygamy does not make her 
an unfit parent; in fact, her independence makes her a strong, dependable 
mother.  The other extreme argues that these women are not making a choice, 
but rather, are brainwashed victims.  Their state of mind, parenting skills, and 
subordination to their husbands make them unfit parents.  Ultimately, this Note 
takes the position that in consideration of the precarious situation of the 
mothers and the impressive need to protect the children, courts should lower 
the standard required to remove children from mothers who choose to maintain 
their FLDS polygamous lifestyle. 
1. Women as Warriors: The Mothers Deserve Custody 
The women’s rights perspective, seeking to establish a woman’s right to 
choose and exist as an individual free to make all her own decisions, argues 
strongly for the mothers’ right to keep their children.102  Arguably, polygamy 
is not always immoral, and it is a woman’s right to choose to be married to a 
man who has more than one wife.103  These women should be respected for 
acting in accordance with their beliefs and for following their own 
convictions.104  “Polygamy does not compel them to do this,” but rather 
permits them to do it if they so desire.105  Viewing the woman’s choice as her 
own, proponents of this position argue that she can engage in polygamy and 
still be a fit parent. 
 
 100. See Sigman, supra note 93, at 140. 
 101. Id. at 141–42. 
 102. Discussion on an international scale of the rights of women in polygamous relationships 
is beyond the scope of this article.  Views on the traditional practices of Islam, for example, are 
highly distinguishable because it occurs in an area where such practice is a widely accepted 
cultural norm.  See Michéle Alexandre, Big Love: Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a True 
Possibility?, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 5 (2007). 
 103. A PLEA FOR POLYGAMY 24 (Panurge Press 1929). 
 104. Id. at 25. 
 105. Id. at 54. 
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In Sanderson v. Tryon,106 the parents had three children, two of whom 
were born while they were practicing polygamy.107  After leaving the 
polygamous relationship with her husband, the mother entered another plural 
marriage, while the father abandoned it.108  Except for the practice of 
polygamy, the lower court presented no findings to support the conclusion that 
the best interests of the children would be served by awarding custody to the 
father.109  The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a parent’s extra-
marital sexual relationship alone is insufficient to justify a change in custody”, 
and therefore, evidence the mother is practicing polygamy is insufficient on its 
own to support the lower court’s finding.110  Instead, the court found 
“polygamous practices should only be considered as one among many other 
factors regarding [a child’s] best interests.”111 
Polygamous mothers also have their parental rights to lean on.  Generally, 
a parent deserves “authority in her own household and in the rearing of her 
children.”112  Justice Rutledge acknowledged that “[t]he parent’s conflict with 
the state over control of the child and his training is serious enough when only 
secular matters are concerned.  It becomes the more so when an element of 
religious conviction enters.”113  It is cardinal to the Court that “the custody, 
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply 
nor hinder.”114  “There is a presumption that [it is] in the best interest and 
welfare of [a] child to be reared under the custody and control of its natural 
parent.”115  But the inclination for the natural parent is only a preference: the 
presumption may still be rebutted when criminal acts are involved.116 
In the FLDS, it is the women who “have largely had to assume a public 
mantle these past months, making court appearances, trying to defend both 
their faith and their lifestyle in the face of deep skepticism.”117  The Supreme 
Court of Utah emphasized in one opinion that “[t]he fact that our constitution 
requires the state to prohibit polygamy does not necessarily mean that the state 
 
 106. 739 P. 2d 623 (Utah 1987). 
 107. Id. at 624. 
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 109. Id. at 626. 
 110. Id. at 627. 
 111. Sanderson, 739 P. 2d at 627. 
 112. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 166. 
 115. In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 907 (Utah 1955). 
 116. Over the last twenty years “several states have implemented statutory and common law 
presumptions against child custody for persons convicted of selected crimes.”  Deborah Ahrens, 
Note, Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal 
Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 754 (2000).  See also infra Part I.D. 
 117. Sara Corbett, Children of God, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27, 2008, § 6, at 39. 
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must deny any or all civil rights and privileges to polygamists.”118  It is 
important to determine if the mother is the only one who can give the children 
“the reasonable nurture, care, guidance, and love as a foundation for realizing 
their highest potential as human beings.”119  “In re Adoption of W.A.T. 
illustrates the Utah court’s realization that the rights of individuals within 
polygamous systems are still worthy of protections despite the illegality of 
polygamy.”120 
2. Women as Victims: The Mothers Should Lose Custody 
The opposite view is that women in polygamous relationships chose a 
lifestyle that is unacceptable for children to endure, especially in light of the 
attitude such women have towards their children and themselves.  Letters 
written by Catharine Cottam Romney to her parents in 1873 of her decision to 
“marry” into polygamy reveal some of the weaknesses these women exhibit.  
She wrote, “You may think that if I had a disposition to do as you would like, I 
should have given him up.  I have tried many times to bring my mind and 
feelings to it but have failed . . . I know I am weak and foolish.”121  Also, as 
explained above, there are often reports of the physical abuse suffered by 
FLDS women.  One former polygamist wife “recalls seeing her father, Vergel, 
smack her mother for expressing jealousy over his second wife, Mae.”122  A 
former FLDS woman emphasized that many plural wives were born into the 
polygamous sect and “do not know any other lifestyle.”123  These women have 
“never experienced the freedom to think for themselves or to freely question 
their leaders.”124  The women stay sweet and quiet “to sacrifice their feelings 
for the greater ‘good.’”125 
As the dissent in In re W.A.T. argues, polygamous practice has a 
detrimental effect that is both harmful to the child and a red flag concerning 
the fitness of the parent.126  Scholars argue that the impact of the 
Fundamentalist polygamous lifestyle on the autonomy, integrity, and equality 
 
 118. In re Adoption of W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Utah 1991). 
 119. Id. at 1087 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
 120. Michéle Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic Polygamy: A Case for Expanding the 
American Concept of Surviving Spouse so as to Include De Facto Polygamous Spouses, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1473 (2007). 
 121. LETTERS OF CATHARINE COTTAM ROMNEY, PLURAL WIFE 10 (Jennifer Moulton 
Hansen ed., 1992). 
 122. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 1, at A1. 
 123. Kathy Jo Nicholson, On Polygamy: Former FLDS Member Speaks Out, CNN NEWS, 
Apr. 16, 2008, http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2008/04/16/on-polygamy-former-flds-wife-speaks-
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 126. See In re Adoption W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Utah 1991). 
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of adult women is “sufficiently troubling.”127  Although removing the children 
from their mothers is a harsh remedy, essentially burdening the mothers and 
children with the sins of the husbands and fathers, the genuine interest in the 
public welfare and childrens’ welfare outweighs the concern.128  As the Black 
court lamented, “How much more inexcusable for these parents to hide behind 
this religious cover while subjecting their children to what must be reasonably 
anticipated as an entrapment into this system.”129 
“Religion—the reason these women say they stay . . . is also used to 
validate the brainwashing and, in some cases, physical abuse employed to keep 
women and children submissive,” said Marci Hamilton, a law professor and 
author who has studied polygamist sects for ten years.130  “The women are 
wholly dependent on the patriarchal community.”131  The primary 
responsibility of women in these communities is to serve their husbands, 
conceive as many children as possible, and “raise those children to become 
obedient members of the religion.”132  They often lack education, have few 
marketable skills and are told of “terrible forces outside the compound,” 
namely “evil people” who want to and will harm them if they leave.133  
Hamilton also emphasizes that there is always the prospect of eternal 
damnation: “It’s not only physically dangerous to leave, you’re also risking 
your soul.”134  Staying amidst the emotional, mental, and even sexual abuse 
“may look like a smarter choice to a lot of these people.”135 
Kathy Jo Nicholson, a former FLDS member, shared many of these 
struggles.136  As she viewed one of their male leaders in chains facing criminal 
charges, she “couldn’t help but think about the many women and children still 
bound in psychological chains inside the FLDS.”137  Nicholson stated that 
“these mothers . . . need to stop enabling these men to hurt their children.”138  
She continued, “Women who are trapped in abuse are often unable to see the 
damage that it is doing to their children.”139  Nicholson emphasized that the 
women in polygamous cultures need to seek help and counseling for 
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themselves in order to then be able to protect their children.140  She explained 
that the husbands and leaders in the Texas case are guilty of wrongdoing, but 
the mothers are responsible, too: “Wake up women of the FLDS!  These are 
your children!  And you have contributed to their abuse!”141 
Whether the mothers are seen as warriors, victims, or even abusers, courts 
must also focus on the best interests of the children.  Parental power, even 
when linked to a Free Exercise claim, may be subject to limitation if it appears 
the health or safety of the child is in jeopardy, or if there is potential for 
significant social burdens.142  The Supreme Court has noted that “neither rights 
of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”143  The preference 
for a child to remain with his or her natural parents must be weighed against 
the harm the child is experiencing while living with the parents.  Within the 
FLDS’ polygamous setting, courts need to lower the best interest test’s harm 
threshold for necessity to remove a child from parental custody—the 
polygamous lifestyle exposes the children to far too much emotional, physical, 
and sexual abuse. 
D. Child Custody and Polygamy: The Best Interests of the Child 
Society has an interest in protecting the welfare of its children.144  It is in 
the best interest of youths and the entire community that children be “both 
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and 
independent well-developed men and citizens.”145  The Supreme Court stated 
in Prince that “the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this 
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”146  
Although it is highly desirable for children to be raised by their natural 
mothers, it is “more desirable that they be brought up as law-abiding citizens in 
righteous homes.  The price is too great to require these children to continue 
under the same influences they have been exposed to.”147  Courts asserted that 
the practice of polygamy should be “weeded out” and that children should not 
be exposed to “its evil influence and environment” because it is sufficiently 
reprehensible “without the innocent lives of children being seared by [its] evil 
influence.”148 
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1. The Best Interests of the Child 
In defining how to best protect the needs of children, courts developed 
varying “best interests of the child” tests.  Most employ a “best interests of the 
child” factors test, where a parent’s religious practice is one of the many 
factors considered.149  Courts have discretion in this decision, as there is 
seemingly no hard-line definition for what is in the “best interests” of a child; 
rather, it is something to be discerned from the particular circumstances of 
each case.150  There are in fact a “myriad of factors [a] court may properly 
consider in determining a child’s best interests.”151  Unfortunately, this wide 
disparity in factors that courts consider highlights the lack of clear guidance 
concerning what factors should be considered or how each factor should be 
weighed. 
In the recent Texas appellate case In re J.J.S., the factors that were 
addressed included the desires of the child, the physical and emotional needs of 
the child, the danger to the child now and in the future, parental ability, plans 
for the child, stability of the home, acts or omissions by a parent that show the 
parent–child relationship is not proper, and any excuse for the acts of the 
parent.152  The court held that the requisite endangerment to warrant removal 
may be found if the evidence showed a course of conduct by the parent that 
exposes a child to loss, injury, or jeopardizes their safety or well-being.153  
Other relevant circumstances courts consider include the available alternatives 
for the child, the actual nature and content of the lifestyle, the existence and 
quality of an ongoing relationship between the parent and child, and any 
special needs of the child.154  As exemplified by In re Texas,155 some courts are 
 
 149. In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) Courts applying the 
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examining the level of “imminent harm” to the child as an almost decisive 
factor. 
Court analysis becomes even more complicated depending on whether or 
not the “best interests” test is examined under strict scrutiny.  Under a strict 
scrutiny analysis, finding in favor of removing a child from the mother’s 
custody is difficult because it demands a showing of “substantial” harm from 
exposure to the religion.156  Even if the “best interests of the child” test 
indicates that removal is warranted, it does not satisfy the requirements of 
heightened scrutiny to remove custody from the parent on its own, because in 
some cases the child can be adequately protected by a standard that encroaches 
less on religious conduct.157 
To make things even more difficult for the state asserting custody, the 
“actual or likely harm” factor was born and coupled with the “best interests” 
standard, making deprivation of parental child custody even harder to 
achieve.158  Changing the “best interests of the child” test “in this way means 
that some level of harm must be shown to result from the parent’s religiously 
motivated conduct before the parent can be deprived of parental rights on that 
basis alone.”159  The level of harm a child experiences is a strong factor, if not 
the deciding factor, in many decisions.  The issue is in determining what is 
considered harm sufficient to warrant removal from the natural parents.  
“Preventing intolerable harm to others is a compelling interest that justifies 
regulation of religion on even the most protective theory of free exercise.”160  
The disagreement is over how to strike the balance.161 
The “harm” requirement may have only added further confusion to the 
“best interests of the child” standard.  Whether or not a court chooses to apply 
heightened scrutiny, the level of harm that must be shown is a highly debated 
matter.  “While some courts have required a showing of actual harm to the 
child, other courts require only some likelihood of harm to the child.”162  One 
scholar notes that these cases are defined by four levels of risk: actual harm; a 
substantial threat of harm; only some risk of harm; or no risk—but religion is 
always a factor.163  Clearly, trying to balance a parent’s right to practice 
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religion with adequate protection of the child’s needs is not an easy task and 
one that courts disagree on as they attempt to apply varying, unstable tests and 
standards. 
As courts struggle to determine the relevant factors, choose the level of 
scrutiny to apply, and consider the level of harm necessary for removal, the 
“best interests of the child” results in recent years seem to be shifting in favor 
of child custody regardless of religious practice.  Some scholars go so far as to 
suggest that courts cannot decide child custody cases based on free exercise 
arguments for religious reasons and must find either “a neutral basis for a 
ruling or refuse to intervene.”164  Others take a more middle-ground approach 
in asserting that custody rights should not be diminished for a parent’s 
religious beliefs unless it is both against the “best interests” of the child and 
“actually likely to cause the child significant secular harm.”165 
Polygamy, however, plays an uncomfortable role in the realm of religious 
belief since it is a crime.  Although courts seem to be leaning towards tolerance 
of polygamy, some have considered whether polygamy should be a crime 
detrimental enough to constitute per se loss of child custody. 
2. The Crime of Polygamy: No Per Se Removal 
Certainly a very strong factor and indicator of harm to a child is criminal 
activity in the household.  “To cut off association with such a [criminal] as a 
condition to the child custody would be entirely reasonable.”166  But this has 
not been established as a per se rule.  “Polygamous sects . . . throughout the 
United States” have been identified as “a form of organized crime” by Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid, who has spoken in support of measures to curb 
the practice.167  He further emphasized that the “lawless conduct of 
polygamous communities in the United States deserves national attention and 
federal action.”168 
But despite polygamy’s criminal status, most courts do not want to 
establish a per se rule, finding that illegal parental conduct is not “a threshold 
determination,” but rather, that such conduct is “subsumed by the interest of 
the child standard.”169  In In re Adoption of W.A.T., a polygamous couple from 
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an FLDS church sought to adopt six children.170  The district court dismissed 
the petition to adopt.171  The Utah Supreme Court reversed, disagreeing with 
the finding that “the alternative lifestyle of these prospective adoptive parents 
per se made them ineligible to petition for adoption.”172  It held that illegal or 
unconstitutional conduct is not a “threshold determination” in an adoption 
petition, but rather is just a factor under the “best interest” test.173  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also rejected the argument “that a court may 
prohibit a parent from discussing religious beliefs with a child” solely because 
acting on them would be a crime.174  It emphasized that “the illegality of the 
proposed conduct on its own is not sufficient to warrant the restriction.”175 
On the other hand, it may also be argued that even if strict scrutiny is 
applied, where evidence of substantial harm to the child due to a religious 
practice is required, an illegal religious practice should always be enough to 
hurdle the harm requirement and remove the child.  Carl E. Schneider 
emphasized that critics of the “best interest” test seem most worried about how 
factors such as religion and sexual misconduct are used in custody decisions.176  
He argued that these bases for decision “can easily, clearly, and cheaply be 
attacked by direct prohibitions.”177  Thus, courts or the legislature could 
fashion a rule that the practice of polygamy is strictly prohibited and parental 
custody is lost automatically, rather than trying to determine how it weighs 
against many other factors. 
The In re Adoption of W.A.T. dissent also indicated that the presence of 
polygamy should be a per se denial.178  It emphasized that it was difficult to 
“conceive of any factor or combination of factors favorable to an adoption . . . 
which would outweigh the detrimental effect of felonious conduct engaged in 
by them.”179  In the child custody context, Justice Henriod’s In re Black 
concurrence seems to agree: parents should be deprived of child custody if 
they practice and teach their children to commit a felony.180  In addressing 
whether “any felony” should be per se exclusion, the court admits that 
“[w]here children and parents and religion are involved, the answer to the 
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question tends to stick in our throats, but we are duty bound to utter it when 
confronted with it.”181 
The question then becomes what criminal activities are or should be per se 
denials of child custody, and whether the practice of polygamy falls within that 
category.  Is polygamy so detrimental that the mother should be completely 
deprived of child custody?182  This potentially harsh outcome may be why 
courts are hesitant to make polygamous activity a per se denial of child 
custody, since it raises the difficult and perhaps delicate question of what 
felonies are severe enough to warrant removal. 
This Note does not take the position that evidence of polygamy should 
result in per se denial of custody since that could result in loss of custody in 
some cases where it is not deserved.  Instead, courts need to reconsider how 
high the “harm” bar has been raised in the “best interests” factors analysis.  It 
is time to lower that bar in order to better protect the children in polygamous 
sects.  Most fundamentalists of any faith seek to adhere unfailingly to their 
god’s true commandments.183  We live in a country where the freedom to 
practice one’s religion is a respected right; so it is important to establish that 
harm is actually occurring in order for the state to interfere with the practice.  
As a result, not all polygamous relationships may be harmful enough to 
warrant loss of child custody.  This Note argues, however, that the harm 
requirement should almost always be met in an isolated, fundamentalist sect 
setting. 
II.  IMPACT OF IN RE TEXAS 
A. The Custody Continuum 
A court’s stance on child custody falls along a continuum, with the Texas 
majority, the Texas concurrence, and In re Black emphasizing three important 
points.  On one end of the spectrum is the Texas majority stance, holding that 
all the children should be returned to the mothers.184  Courts on this end of the 
spectrum avoid critical analysis of the potential for abuse in the polygamous 
setting, deferring instead to the local investigation agencies.185  In the middle is 
the Texas concurrence: The pubescent girls should remain in state custody, but 
the younger girls and the boys should be returned to the mothers.186  This 
middle stance attempts to fumble through the difficult “best interests of the 
child” analysis and determine if there is harm sufficient to warrant removal.187  
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The other end of the spectrum, discussed infra Part IV, is the stance of the 
Utah Supreme Court: evidence of polygamy should constitute removal of all 
the children from their mothers, removing some of the pressure of the “best 
interests” analysis and lowering the harm requisite for removal unless the 
mothers agree to stop practicing polygamy and leave the sect.188  Each stance 
will be examined to determine the best way to respect the mothers’ rights and 
protect the children. 
B. In re Texas: Facts and Analysis 
In re Texas had two potential outcomes: either it would crack down on 
polygamy and deny the mothers of child custody, spurring a legal movement 
back towards intolerance of the practice, or it would join the current legal 
trend, showing continued leniency towards polygamists and award the mothers 
child custody despite the evidence of polygamous practice.  The majority 
opinion followed the latter trend, further extending leniency to parents 
engaging in polygamy.189 
On March 29, 2008, the Texas Department of Family Protective Services 
received a telephone call from a sixteen-year-old girl named Sarah who alleged 
she was “being physically and sexually abused” at the Yearning for Zion 
ranch, a place associated with the FLDS.190  Four days later at around 9:00 
p.m., investigators and police officials entered the ranch and interviewed the 
adults and children residing there throughout the night.191  Concerned about 
polygamous marriages involving minor girls, the Department took possession 
of all the children at the Ranch without a court order.192 
In the interviews, the Department learned there were many polygamist 
families at the ranch and a number of girls under eighteen were either pregnant 
or already mothers themselves.193  “[T]he ranch’s religious leader, ‘Uncle 
Merrill,’ had the unilateral power to decide when and to whom [the girls] 
would be married.”194  The families’ expert witness confirmed that the FLDS 
church accepts the age of first menstruation as the age of eligibility for 
“marriage.”195  Child psychologist Dr. Bruce Duncan Perry testified that the 
underage pregnancies on the Ranch were “the result of sexual abuse because 
children at the age of fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen are not sufficiently 
 
 188. In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 913 (Utah 1955). 
 189. Texas Dep’t of Family Protec. Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615 (holding that removal of the 
children was unwarranted and directing the district court to vacate the order). 
 190. Id. at 613; In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May 
22, 2008). 
 191. Texas Dep’t of Family Protec. Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 613. 
 192. Id. at 613–14. 
 193. Id. at 616 (O’Neill, J., concurring in part). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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emotionally mature to enter a healthy consensual sexual relationship or a 
‘marriage.’”196  The underage girls were not legally married but rather 
spiritually married, sharing the husband with multiple other spiritual wives.197 
Thirty-eight mothers filed a writ of mandamus requiring the district court 
to vacate its temporary orders naming the Department as sole managing 
conservator of their children, which did not include all the parents of all the 
children involved.198  The appellate court reversed the district court, finding the 
Department failed to carry its burden of showing an immediate danger to the 
physical health or safety of the children as demanded by Texas Family Code 
section 262.201(b)(1).199  The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, vacating the 
temporary custody orders and remanding the case for further Suits Affecting 
the Parent–Child Relationship (SAPCR) proceedings200 and a final custody 
ruling.201 
The Texas Supreme Court specifically shied away from addressing the 
substantive issues, noting that although the custody proceedings “involve 
important, fundamental issues concerning parental rights and the State’s 
interest in protecting children, it is premature for us to address those issues.”202  
The majority reasoned that based on the record, disturbing the court of appeals’ 
decision and removing “the children was not warranted.”203  Rather than 
turning the analysis on the extent of any harm present, the court agreed with 
the appellate court, finding that the Texas statute required a showing of 
“imminent” harm to determine whether the children were in danger and needed 
to be removed.204  Texas Family Code section 262.201(b)(1) provides that a 
child must be returned to the parent unless sufficient evidence shows that 
“there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the child which was 
 
 196. Texas Dep’t of Family Protec. Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616. 
 197. Id. 
 198. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1. 
 199. Id. at *3.  Texas Family Code § 262.201(b) provides: 
At the conclusion of the full adversary hearing, the court shall order the return of the child 
to the parent, managing conservator, possessory conservator, guardian, caretaker, or 
custodian entitled to possession unless the court finds sufficient evidence to satisfy a 
person of ordinary prudence and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health 
or safety of the child which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to 
possession and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child. 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b) (2008). 
 200. In re Texas, 255 S.W.3d at 615.  SAPCRs are “suits affecting the parent-child 
relationship.”  Id. at 614.  Here the suit was a request for emergency removal of the children from 
their parents and limited parental access, as well as requested appointment to be temporary sole 
managing conservator of the children.  Id. 
 201. Id. at 615. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 616. 
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caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to possession and for 
the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child.”205 
The court ruled that the requisite danger in the statute did not exist unless 
the need for protection was urgent and warranted immediate removal.206  
Evidence that children raised in the FLDS environment “may someday have 
their physical health and safety threatened” was not imminent enough to 
invoke the “measure of immediate removal prior to full litigation.”207  
Although the majority acknowledged that the SAPCR investigation would 
continue and the children could ultimately be removed, it refused to uphold the 
immediate temporary removal of the children.208  The Relator’s Writ was 
granted conditionally, and pending the district court’s vacating its temporary 
custody of the children, the children were returned to their mothers.209 
C. The Concurrence Opinion: Split Child Custody 
In the Texas Supreme Court opinion in In re Texas, Justice O’Neill 
presented her own views in a concurrence, seeking a middle ground.210  Justice 
O’Neill proposed that the boys and pre-pubescent girls should return to their 
mothers, but that the pubescent girls should remain in state custody because the 
evidence of imminent danger to them was sufficient.211 
Justice O’Neill agreed with the majority in finding an “imminence” 
requirement in the Texas statute.212  She also joined the majority opinion in 
finding that there was no evidence of imminent danger to the physical health or 
safety of the boys or pre-pubescent girls to justify their removal from the YFZ 
ranch.213  Unlike the majority position however, Justice O’Neill felt the 
Department should retain temporary custody over the pubescent girls, 
potentially ready for “spiritual” marriage, “until such time as a permanency 
plan designed to ensure each girl’s physical health and safety could be 
approved.”214  She argued that the state had presented adequate evidence of a 
danger to the physical health or safety of pubescent girls on the ranch based on 
evidence of a pattern or practice of sexual abuse and the condoning of such 
sexual abuse.215  The pattern of sexual abuse was enough to satisfy the 
 
 205. TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201(b)(1) (2008). 
 206. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014 at *3 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008) 
(emphasis in original). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at *4. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protec. Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616. (O’Neill, J. concurring). 
 211. Id. at 617. 
 212. Id. at 616. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protec. Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616–17. 
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assertion that all the girls of the same age and older at the ranch were also at 
risk.216  “‘[T]he urgent need for protection required the immediate removal’ of 
those girls.”217 
Justice O’Neill’s concurrence is further on the continuum towards 
removing the children from the mothers than the majority opinion, which held 
all the children should be returned pending final SAPCR proceedings.218  It is 
still very much in line with the majority opinion analytically, however, since 
she focuses on the imminence of danger rather than engaging in a “best 
interests” analysis.219  Justice O’Neill also quotes the Texas code regarding the 
“danger” standard, noting that it “includes exposure of the child to loss or 
injury that jeopardizes the physical health or safety of the child without regard 
to whether there has been an actual prior injury to the child.”220  She referred to 
a prior holding which found that “it is not necessary that the conduct be 
directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.”221  Despite these 
points that seem to head towards a lower harm threshold to warrant removal, 
Justice O’Neill still did not find the requisite harm had been met for all of the 
children.222 
III.  THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM: IN RE BLACK AND CONDITIONAL 
CUSTODY 
Years ago, the In re Black Utah Supreme Court opinion voiced reasoning 
opposite to the views of the Texas Supreme Court, refusing to tolerate the 
polygamous lifestyle.  On July 24, 1953, Arizona law enforcement officers 
raided the isolated polygamous village straddling the Utah–Arizona border 
where the Blacks lived and took the mothers and children away from the 
vicinity.223  Mr. Leonard Black had fathered three families and a total of 
twenty-six children.224  The petition alleged that the dependent children were 
not receiving “proper subsistence, . . . medical care and other support . . . 
necessary for their well-being.”225  It also alleged that the parents were 
teaching and encouraging the children to believe in the practice of polygamy 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 616. 
 218. Id. at 615. 
 219. Id. at 616. 
 220. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protec. Servs., 255 S.W.3d at at 617 (O’Neill, J., concurring) 
(quoting TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201(b)(1) (2008)). 
 221. Id.; cf. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987) (finding 
the definition of “endangered” would include imprisonment, as compared to Texas Dep’t of 
Family and Protec. Servs., where the actions at the YFZ ranch in regards to pubescent girls were 
determined to be “dangerous”). 
 222. In re Texas, 255 S.W.3d at 618. 
 223. In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 888 (Utah 1955). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 889. 
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and encouraging them to engage in it, injuring the morals and welfare of the 
children.226  Mr. Black vehemently denied the allegations, asserting his 
children “are healthy and strong, well dressed and well clothed and have 
always been well fed.”227 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court and held that parents 
who, on religious principles, entered an illegal polygamous marriage, were 
properly deprived of the right of custody and control of their children.228  The 
parents were “charged with knowledge of the existence of the laws prohibiting 
polygamy” and, by violating them, were neglecting the moral well-being of 
their children.229  The court it acknowledged, 
It is true that taking these children from their parents does seem harsh, and 
visits the sins of this father upon these children . . . but unless we are genuinely 
concerned for the welfare of these children and for the public welfare and 
apply the harsh treatment required and stop the spread of this immoral and 
illegal practice the sins of this father will be visited upon the children of these 
children to the third and fourth generations.230 
Unlike the Texas Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court did not consider 
or discuss the “imminence” of the danger to the children, but instead assumed 
it existed.231  The court acknowledged that “it is not certain that these children 
will follow in the footsteps of the parents” but held that is not reason enough to 
deny justification, because “when they enter upon the pattern set for them it 
will be too late for the protective arm of the state to help.”232 
The Utah court cited the Supreme Court’s attitude towards polygamy, 
namely that “[f]ew crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society, 
and receive more general or more deserved punishment.”233  It emphasized that 
religious practices “must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country.”234  
Because the parents violated the law in practicing polygamy and advocated its 
correctness to their children, they forfeited the right to have their children.235 
Unlike the Texas Supreme Court, the statute addressed by the Utah 
Supreme Court used a “best interests of the child” factors test to determine if 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 889 (internal quotations omitted). 
 228. Black, 283 P.2d at 888. 
 229. Id. at 894. 
 230. Id. at 909. 
 231. Id. at 891 (finding that the mother and father had “knowingly failed and neglected to 
provide for said children the proper maintenance, care, training and education . . . and the welfare 
of the children requires the right of custody and control over said children be taken from their 
parents”). 
 232. Id. at 910. 
 233. Black, 283 P.2d at 904 (citation omitted). 
 234. Id. at 904. 
 235. Id. at 909. 
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the children were “neglected.”236  The factors considered included the “home 
environment, history, associations, and general condition of [the] children,” 
and any necessary physical and mental examinations made by competent 
physicians and psychologists.237  The court also found a much lower threshold 
of harm to justify removal—sexual or physical abuse was not an issue and 
never discussed in the opinion.238  Under Utah law, the court emphasized a 
“neglected child” was one “who lacks proper parental care by reason of the 
faults or habits of the parent,” “whose parent . . . neglects or refuses to provide 
proper or necessary . . . morals or wellbeing,” or a child “who is found in a 
disreputable place or who associates with vagrant, vicious or immoral 
persons.”239  It was enough to the court that polygamy was practiced in the 
presence of the children and that they were encouraged to believe and engage 
in plural marriage.240  The parents forfeited the right to have custody of the 
children because they “affirmatively and knowingly provided the children with 
the care, training and education violative of law and morals.”241 
Although the Utah court found that it was in the best interests of the 
children to place them in state custody, it also held that the children could 
remain in the custody of their parents if certain conditions were met.242  The 
parents had to comply with the laws of Utah relating to marriage and sexual 
offenses, refrain from counseling, encouraging or advising their children to 
violate the laws of Utah relating to marriage and sexual offenses; encourage 
them to abide by the law; report once a month to a probation officer; and 
submit a monthly written sworn statement to the court stating whether or not 
he or she had complied with the conditions set forth.243  If the parents did not 
accept the conditions, they would be permanently deprived of custody rights 
and the children would be placed for adoption since the best interests of the 
children would not be served if trained in the way of immorality and crime.244  
Since the parents refused to meet the conditions, the judgment of the juvenile 
 
 236. Id. at 895.  See also In re State Interest of Graham, 170 P.2d 172, 175 (Utah 1946).  
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-6 (1953) provided: 
In all cases relating to the delinquency, neglect, dependency or other cases of children and 
their disposition . . . the court . . . may adopt any form of procedure in such cases which it 
deems best suited to ascertain the facts relating to such cases and to make a disposition in 
the best interest of such children and of the public. 
 237. Black, 283 P.2d at 893 (internal quotations omitted). 
 238. See id. at 900. 
 239. Id. at 895 (internal quotations omitted). 
 240. Id. at 901. 
 241. Id. at 909. 
 242. Black, 283 P.2d at 892. 
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court was upheld, and the Blacks were deprived of the right of custody and 
control of their children.245 
IV.  TIME TO RETURN TO INTOLERANCE OF POLYGAMY 
This Note takes the position that in considering the best interests of the 
children and the mothers, the Texas Supreme Court fails to reach a viable 
solution.  The majority opinion of In re Texas is far too lenient, turning its head 
to the side in the face of child abuse.  Justice O’Neill’s concurrence is simply a 
band-aid for the underlying problems, not an effective long-lasting solution.  If 
only the girls of thirteen-years and older are removed, the twelve-year-old girls 
who will experience that same imminent danger in one year are simply 
abandoned by the court to await their abusive fate.  What is the point in 
delaying removal if it is clear that, at some point, each child will be in 
imminent danger under the Texas standard?  Attempts to determine what is 
considered “imminent danger” simply delay the inevitable and avoid the 
acknowledgement that the harm is present for all the children, whether it is in 
the present or in the foreseeable future.  As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, 
“If we now ignore our duty to the state, to society, to decent citizenship and to 
these children and to others who will undoubtedly be born to these [people], if 
no bars are put in place, the task will be still more difficult for our successors 
to cope with.”246  Courts that refuse to rule on the inevitable are shutting their 
eyes to what is before them and effectively allowing child abuse to continue.  
“[B]y turning a blind eye to polygamy’s negative ramifications, state 
governments indirectly condone and thus perpetuate abuse and neglect.”247 
The Utah Supreme Court’s In re Black opinion offers a much better 
direction than the In re Texas case to guide the modern legal stance toward 
polygamy.  The Utah Supreme Court found loss of custody justified solely on 
evidence of children being raised in an “immoral environment” and taught to 
believe in the practice of polygamy.248  That justification for loss of custody 
should be vastly magnified when there is evidence of physical, emotional, and 
sexual abuse.  Children raised in the presence of polygamy were deemed 
sufficiently harmed to warrant their removal by the 1955 Utah court.  Courts 
need to reexamine what is demanded as sufficient harm to remove children.  
Recent precedents have set the bar too high, subjecting innocent children to 
undeserved abuse from which they must be protected. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court did not go so far as to decide that 
evidence of polygamy warrants per se loss of child custody.  Both the Texas 
and Utah courts displayed concern for the mothers, seeming to understand the 
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brutal impact their decisions would presumably have on them.  Noting that the 
children “could have been no worse off had they been without a father,”249 the 
Utah Court did not view the mothers in the same light.  The Utah opinion, 
however, differed from the Texas stance in a very important way: the Utah 
case did not automatically return the children to the mothers, but rather, 
imposed a condition.  It instructed the lower court, if it saw fit, that “the 
children be allowed to remain with the mother . . . but on the specific condition 
that [the husband] desist from living with her.”250  The court emphasized the 
“complete cessation” of the relationship, stating that if it remains in any 
capacity the court “should take the children from appellants permanently” and 
that custody should not be left with the father or both parents in any event.251  
This balance allows the mothers the option to assert their parental rights and 
retain custody of their children. 
It is important that courts understand the need to reevaluate the harm 
standard in the “best interests of the child” test.  As scholar Douglas Laycock 
points out, “[B]elievers have no constitutional right to inflict significant harm 
on nonconsenting others.”252  Another scholar, Marci A. Hamilton, emphasizes 
that “the legislature should weigh, on the one hand, the importance of respect 
and tolerance for a wide panoply of religious faiths, and on the other hand, 
whether the harm that the law was intended to prevent can be tolerated in a just 
society.”253  It is well-established that sexual abuse is a harm the United States 
finds intolerable.254  Time will demonstrate that the practice of polygamy in 
fundamentalist sects “is abusive to children, is abusive to women, is abusive to 
society.”255 
The fairest compromise and balance of the children’s needs and the 
mothers’ rights is the Utah standard.  Under the Utah standard, the children 
must be protected from the FLDS practices, but the mothers can choose to 
abandon their lifestyle and retain custody of their children if they so desire.  
The Texas concurring opinion is too lenient, allowing the pre-pubescent 
children to be returned to the polygamous setting.  Utah effectively lowers the 
harm requirement, finding the requirement met when FLDS polygamous 
practices are occurring and taught to children.  By allowing the mothers to 
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eliminate the harm, however, it also rightly acknowledges the value of keeping 
natural families together. 
CONCLUSION 
When considering child custody rulings regarding children in polygamous 
sects, courts should thoroughly review the In re Black decision.  The trend 
towards more lenient custody standards is not in the best interests of the 
children or the mothers.  However, adopting a per se rule denying custody to 
the parents would stretch too far, netting situations when removal is not 
warranted.  The In re Black approach is appropriate because it provides the 
mothers with the power to choose between a criminal lifestyle and their 
children, while taking a firmer stance against the practice of polygamy at the 
same time.  The mothers should be dictating whether or not they retain custody 
over their children, but within the legal standards to which they must adhere.  
Courts should be more reluctant to allow children to remain in a polygamous 
FLDS sect setting, but provide an option for the mothers to decide to end the 
polygamous relationship and keep their children.  This rule would destroy the 
imminence requirement read into the Texas statute and help eliminate the 
problems with the variable “best interests of the child” standards, making the 
requisite harm to warrant removal lower and much clearer.  It is a much better 
balance between religious rights, respecting the rights of the mothers, and 
doing what is in the best interests of the children. 
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